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A NEW WAVE OF SIXTH AMENDMENT
WAIVERS: THE USE OF JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AS ADVISERS
MARK A. COSTANTINO
VITO A. CANNAVO **
ANN GOLDSTEIN* *:*-
T HE fifth 1 and sixth 2 amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion exemplify the balance which exists between effective law en-
forcement and fundamental constitutional rights. These amendments
incorporate the fundamental protections for the criminally accused
that are held paramount to society's interest in prosecuting criminals.
The protections granted by the Constitution, however, are not
ironclad. Often the accused may be asked or induced to give up, or
waive, its protections. On suchf occasions, the interaction between
constitutional rights and criminal prosecution is sharply defined be-
cause societal restraint implicit in the constitutional guarantees defers
to the successful use of evidence. Yet, the courts, wary of involuntary
or unintentional waivers of fundamental rights, hav e attempted to
safeguard those rights. The purpose of this Article, therefore, is to
discuss waiver under the fifth and sixth amendments and to explore
the alternatives that exist to insure a proper balance between pros-
ecution and waiver.
I. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRE-PROSECUTION STAGE
The fifth amendment, perhaps the paradigmatic constitutional pro-
vision, stands as a cornerstone of the fundamental protections af-
forded to the criminally accused. By providing protection against
self-incrimination, the amendment emphasizes the adversarial design
• United States District Judge, Eastern District of New York.
** B.A. 1975, S.U.N.Y. at Stonybrook; J.D. 1978, Cornell University. Mr. Can-
navo, formerly a law clerk to Judge Costantino, is associated with the law firm of
Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, New York City.
***B.A. 1976, Vassar College: J.D. 1979, Albany Law School of Union University.
Ms. Goldstein is law clerk to Judge Costantino. The authors wish to acknowledge the
assistance of Mrs. Jewel Jefferson and Mr. Richard Hertling in preparation of this
manuscript.
1. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "n]o
person .. .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.-
U.S. Const. amend. V. The self-incrimination clause is applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Mallov v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1. 8 (1964).
2. The sixth amendment to the United" States Constitution provides that "iln all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The sixth amendment is applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Gideon v. Vainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 339-42 (1963).
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of the judicial system and the rejection of inquisitional processes. 3 By
freeing the accused from aiding in his own prosecution,4 the accuser
must carry the burden of proof through independent sources of in-
criminating evidence. 5
The Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona 6 embellished
the simply phrased self-incrimination clause with monumental signifi-
cance. 7 Miranda dealt with the issue 8 of protection against self-
incrimination in the context of custodial interrogation 9 of the accused
by law enforcement authorities. Given a factual situation in which an
individual in custody made incriminating statements without the as-
3. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-46 (1972); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-63 (1966); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,
426-29 (1956); United States v. Yurasovich, 580 F.2d 1212, 1215 (3d Cir. 1978).
4. in re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460
(1966); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2251, at 317-18 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961)
('This philosophy . . . naturally nurtures the concept that the individual may not be
conscripted to assist his adversary, the government, in doing him in."); see Rogers v.
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961). Protection of an individual's privacy is the cen-
tral aim of the privilege against self-incrimination. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 416 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
5. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 4, § 2251, at 317; see Garner v. United States, 424
U.S. 648, 655-56 (1976); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414 n.12
(1966).
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. For a discussion of the impact of Miranda, see Elsen & Rosett, Protections
for the Suspect under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 645 (1967); Grano,
Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Consitutitional Premises Underlying
the Law of Confessions, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (1979). Kamisar, A Dissent from the
Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old
"Voluntariness" Test, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 59 (1966); Lederer, Miranda v. Arizona-The
Law Today, 78 Mil. L. Rev. 107 (1978); Schrock, Welsh & Collins, Interrogational
Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1978); White, Police
Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 581 (1979).
8. The Court framed the issue before it as "deal[ing] with the admissibility of
statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interroga-
tion and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his
privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be comipelled to
incriminate himself." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 439.
9. Custodial interrogation was defined by the Court as "questioning initiated
... after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." Id. at 444 (foonote omitted). Subsequent decisions,
however, demonstrate that the relative nature of both "custody" and "interrogation"
varies, thereby creating uncertainty over the scope of the terms and the periphery of
Miranda's protections. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2186-90
(1980) (incriminating statements made by defendant to an undisclosed, undercover
government informant while in prison and after indictment are inadmissible as viola-
tive of the sixth amendment); United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980)
(questioning by a law enforcement official in a public place does not constitute a
seizure of person); Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980) (express questioning
or its functional equivalent triggers the Miranda safeguards for a suspect in custody).
See generally Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Inter-
rogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67 Geo. L.J. 1 (1978).
SIXTH AMENDMENT WAIVERS
sistance of counsel, the Court found that the presence and assistance
of counsel during custodial interrogation were essential elements of
the privilege.10 The problems inherent in secret or incommunicado
interrogation procedures "1 necessitated the establishment of stan-
dards to protect the individual's guarantee against self-
incrimination.12 Accordingly, the Court required that, prior to any
questioning, the interrogators must inform the subject that he is enti-
tled to an attorney. 13 If an attorney is requested, the interrogators
are required to cease questioning until the attorney is present and to
afford the individual an opportunity to confer with his attorney."4
The failure to provide these guarantees would result in the exclusion
of statements taken from the individual. 15
An ancillary issue that the Court raised and resolved concerned the
waiver of these fifth amendment rights. Recognizing the state's in-
terest in interrogation, 16 the Court granted that waiver would be
permissible, 17 but only after emphasizing the heavy burden carried
by the state to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver.' 8 A
silent record or a statement ultimately given would not indicate that a
waiver had occurred.' 9
Following Miranda, it appeared that only an express statement
would suffice. 2 0 Recently, the Court rejected that notion in North
10. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 469-74.
11. Id. at 445-58.
12. Id. at 467-74.
13. The Court delineated the now renowned "Miranda warnings" as follows: "He
must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." Id. at 479.
14. The Supreme Court had previously guaranteed the right to the appointment
and assistance of counsel at trial. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963).
This guarantee was later extended to situations in which a general investigation has
been narrowed to a specific inquiry focusing on a particular suspect already in cus-
tody. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). Miranda, by entitling the
assistance of counsel to a suspect in custody before he becomes the object of a pros-
ecution or the subject of a specific inquiry, was a logical culmination of this trend of
judicial thinking.
15. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 479.
16. Id. at 475.
17. A suspect in custody can waive his Miranda rights even after he has asserted
them. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102-04 (1975); see United States v. Boyce,
594 F.2d 1246, 1250 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 855 (1979); United States v.
Corral-Martinez, 592 F.2d 263, 267-68 (5th Cir. 1979). A post-assertion waiver is
violative of the suspect's rights only if the questioning officers do not scrupulously
honor the suspect's right to remain silent. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104.
18. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475.
19. Id. at 475-76.
20. The language in Miranda suggested this conclusion. Id. at 475. ('An express
statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an
attorney followed closely bv a statement could constitute a waiver.").
1980]
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Carolina v. Butler.21 In Butler, the state court had ruled that in the
absence of an express statement of waiver, all statements made were
per se inadmissible. 2 2 The Court, after examining its holding in
Miranda, found that an express statement is not indispensable to a
valid waiver.23 Rather, if an individual is properly advised of his
rights and implies by word or action that he wishes to waive those
rights, he may properly do s0.2 4 The Court, therefore, adopted an ad
hoc approach to waiver that would focus on the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. 25 Although an attorney is an important part
of the fifth amendment safeguards, no requirement for his presence at
the time of waiver is imposed. 26
The Supreme Court has expressed its views concerning the proce-
dures necessary to implement the guarantees of the fifth amendment
and has set standards for waiving those protections. Essential guid-
ance for the suspect and the attorney has been provided on the criti-
cal issues-nature of the rights, the trigger mechanism for those
rights, and waiver-concerning the fifth amendment. 2 7 Although the
Court has been equally diligent in delineating a defendant's sixth
amendment rights, the waiver issue remains the subject of con-
troversy and debate.
II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT: WAIVER AT CRITICAL STAGES OF
PROSECUTION
While the fifth amendment guarantees attach to all incidents of cus-
todial interrogation, the sixth amendment guarantees attach only at
critical stages of prosecution.28 A critical stage has been held to exist
at arraignment, 2 9 at a preliminary hearing, 30 at post-indictment iden-
21. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
22. Id. at 370.
23. Id. at 373.
24. Id. at 373-74.
25. Id. at 374-75.
26. See generally North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
27. Professor Kamisar has posed some interesting questions concerning the scope
of these Miranda rights when the focus is shifted to difrerent constitutional guaran-
tees. See Kamisar, supra note 9, at 69-101. For example, can Miranda rights be
scrupulously honored if a police officer "deliberately elicits" information under a sixth
amendment standard? Id. at 73.
28. A critical stage of a criminal prosecution is reached "when the process shifts
from investigatory to accusatory." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
Critical stages involve "'points of time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial
criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, in-
dictment, information, or arraignment." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
29. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52, 53-54 (1961).




tifications, 31 and after indictment. 32 Once an accused has reached a
critical stage of his prosecution, protection of his sixth amendment
rights is guaranteed,33 including the right to the presence and assist-
ance of counsel. 34 Any further attempts by law enforcement au-
thorities to extract statements will be closely scrutinized and a viola-
tion of the guarantees will cause the exclusion of the statements.3 5
Three cases illustrate the nature and scope of the sixth amendment
right to counsel in post-critical stage interrogations. In AMassiahi v.
United States, 36 the defendant was under indictment and had re-
31. Compare Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (plurality opinion) with
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
32. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980).
33. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972) (plurality opinion); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
34. The "guiding hand of counsel" is essential to the accused at a critical stage of
prosecution. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932); accord. Escobedo v. Illinois.
378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 69). Protection of
sixth amendment rights is crucial in "those pretrial procedures that would impair
defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed %vithout counsel." Ger-
stein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975). see Stovall v. Denno. 388 U.S. 293 (1967);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 38.3 U.S. 218
(1967); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See generally Comment, The Right
To Counsel: Attachment Before Criminal Judicial Proceedings?. 47 Fordham L. Rev.
810, 812-22 (1979).
35. The guarantee is personal to the defendant, and therefore, only his state-
ments will be excluded. As the Court noted in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964), "in this case, as in many cases, it was entirely proper to continue an
investigation of the suspected criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged
confederates, even though the defendant had already been indicted. All that we hold
is that the defendant's own incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents
under the circumstances here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used by the
prosecution as evidence against him at his trial." Id. at 207. Given the applicability of
the fourth amendment "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963), to fifth amendment circumstances, Brown v. Il-
linois, 422 U.S. 590, 604-05 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1974),
it seems apparent that evidence improperly obtained through police questioning and
any evidence gathered as a result of those answers is inadmissible under 31assiah.
Thus, Massiahs proviso may eventually be expanded to instances in which the pri-
mary illegality against the interrogated defendant %vill work to exclude evidende con-
cerning other parties involved in the crime. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
413-14 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
36. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The roots of the majority opinion in Massiah can be
traced to the concurring opinions in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). See
Grano, supra note 7, at 19-22 Kamisar, supra note 9. at 34-41. The Spano Court
held that the admission into evidence of a coerced confession from an indicted sus-
pect, who was held in custody and interrogated without the assistance of his retained
counsel, violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 360 U.S. at
323-24. Justice Douglas argued that the police behavior violated the suspect's right to
counsel. Id. at 324-26 (Douglas, J., concurring). "T]lhe right of counsel extends to
the preparation for trial, as well as to the trial itself." Id. at 325 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Furthermore, Justice Stevart believed that the absence of counsel alone
was sufficient to render the confession inadmissible under the fourteenth amend-
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tained an attorney.3 7 During the defendant's release on bail, 38 law
enforcement agents enlisted the assistance of his confederate to en-
gage the defendant in conversation. 39 Unaware of the plan, the de-
fendant made incriminating statements which were used at his trial
and which aided in his conviction. 40 Examining the admissibility of
these statements on fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment grounds,4 1 the
Court opted for a sixth amendment analysis, holding that the defend-
ant was entitled to the assistance of his attorney when agents "delib-
erately elicited" such statements from him after indictment. 42 The
indictment, therefore, clearly served as the triggering device for the
defendant's sixth amendment right to an attorney. 43
Although Massiah indicated that any attempt to use covert methods
of questioning to procure incriminating statements would constitute
deliberate elicitation, 44 the criteria to judge more subtle variations of
questioning were left undefined. The answers were long delayed as
Massiah's significance was unexplored during a period of judicial ac-
tivism in other areas. 45 The full impact of Massiah was resurrected in
Brewer v. Williams. 46
In Brewer, the defendant had been arraigned and had received the
assistance of counsel. 47 During the defendant's transfer to another
jail, however, the police officers who accompanied him elicited in-
criminating statements concerning the commission of the crime by
ment, stating that an indictment is a crucial period for a defendant in a capital crime
prosecution and that, at such a time, the right to the assistance of counsel is absolute.
Id. at 326-27 (Stewart, J., concurring); see Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 204,
37. 377 U.S. at 201.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 202-03.
40. Id. at 203.
41. Id. at 203-04.
42. Id. at 205-06. The "deliberately elicited" test is not readily definable. Sub-
sequent decisions, however, indicate that any attempt by the government to obtain
incriminating statements from a person in a critical stage of prosecution without fully
informing that person of the facts, circumstances, and purposes of the questioning
will satisfy the test. See United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2188 (1980); Rhode
Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689 n.4 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
399-400 (1977). Moreover, the Massiah test invariably encompasses a broader range
of circumstances than a fifth amendment "interrogation" test. See Kamisar, supra
note 9, at 66-68. Compare Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964)
with Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689 (1980). See generally pt. IV(A)-(B)
infra.
43. 377 U.S. at 205-06; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
44. 377 U.S. at 206.
45. During the period after Massiah, the Court was primarily concerned with the
scope of the fourth and fifth amendment guarantees. See Kamisar, supra note 9, at
24-27.
46. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
47. Id. at 391.
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inflaming his religious fervor. 48 Williams challenged the use of these
statements on the bases of his sixth amendment right to -counsel and
his fifth amendment Miranda guarantees. 49 Faced with an interest-
ing option,5 0 the Court decided that a resolution of the Miranda
claim was unnecessary in light of the sixth amendment-Massialh viola-
tion of the right to counsel.51 The Court, following the "deliberate
elicitation" test enunciated in Massiah,5 2 determined that the offi-
cers' questions were designed to produce incriminating statements.53
Because Williams had entered a critical stage of his prosecution-
arraignment-the absence of counsel rendered the statements inad-
missible. 54
Finally, in United States v. Henry,5 5 "situations by design" were
included in an extended "deliberate elicitation" test. The defendant
had been indicted and was in custody. An informant was asked to
listen to his conversations, but not to engage in direct conversations
concerning the crime. 56 Nevertheless, when incriminating statements
were made, the Court found that the, were deliberately elicited by
the compelling circumstances of incarceration and the presence of an
informant. 57
The facts and constitutional issues in the Massialh, Brewer, and
Henry trilogy bear a striking resemblance to those underlying a
Miranda-fifth amendment analysis. Although a Miranda analysis
could easily be adapted to those cases,5 8 a sixth amendment analysis
has been followed because a critical stage of prosecution had been
reached. 59 Whenever a critical stage is presented in a particular fac-
48. Id. at 391-93.
49. Id. at 394-95. Williams had been advised of his Miranda rights prior to the
statements being made. Id. at 391-92.
50. Brewer could have been discussed in terms of either a fifth amendment-
Miranda analysis or a sixth amendment-Massiah analysis. See Kamisar, supra note 9,
at 3-14. Moreover, with current fourth amendment analysis, an option now available
is a motion to suppress under the fourth amendment. See Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
51. 430 U.S. at 397-98.
52. See note 42 supra.
53. 430 U.S. at 399-400. The Court noted "[t]hat the incriminating statements
were elicited surreptitiously in the Alassiah case, and otherwise here, is constitution-
ally irrelevant." Id. at 400 (citations omitted); see United States v. Henr', 100 S. Ct.
2183, 2185-86 (1980).
54. 430 U.S. at 399-401, 406.
55. 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980).
56. Id. at 2184-85.
57. Id. at 2187-89; accord. United States v. Sampol, Nos. 79-1541. -1542, -1808
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 1980) (per curiam).
58. See Kamisar, supra note 9, at 28-33.
59. Professor Kamisar explored the fifth amendment option and analyzed Brewer
under a fifth amendment-Miranda approach. See id. at 24-41. Subsequently, the
Court implied in Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980). that Williams' state-
19801
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tual pattern, a Massiah analysis is appropriate regardless of whether a
Miranda interrogation analysis would seemingly apply and mandate a
different result.6 0 While the protections seem almost indistinguish-
ments would be admissible under a fifth amendment-Miranda analysis. Id. at 1689-
90 & n.4. Innis involved a police ploy similar to the action taken in Brewer. In both
Brewer and Innis, incriminating statements were made. Miranda warnings were is-
sued to both suspects before the ploy was initiated. Innis held that such conduct falls
far short of the "interrogation" required to trigger a fifth amendment-Miranda
analysis. As a result, the answers to the "questioning" were admissible. A similar
result could have been reached in Brewer under a fifth amendment analysis. Yet, by
adopting a sixth amendment analysis, the Brewer Court avoided the complexities that
now arise in light of Innis' fifth amendment analysis. Because Brewer involved a
post-arraignment setting, however, a critical stage had been reached in the prosecu-
tion, thereby initiating a sixth amendment-Massiah analysis. Significantly, the com-
parison of the facts in Brewer and Innis indicates the willingness of the Court to
extend the "deliberately elicited" test of Massiah beyond the Innis "interrogation"
definition despite the factual similarities. When the police, as in Innis, are still in the
investigative stage, no one suspect is the focus of police efforts to gather evidence.
The necessity to solve crime demands a shifting of the balance between the public
and private interests to the police. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has fashioned a1
lenient "interrogation" test to aid the police. When the police power is concentrated
on the conviction of a single individual, however, the individual needs added protec-
tion against the full power of the state. See People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203,
207, 400 N.E.2d 360, 363, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424 (1980) (per curiam). The Massiah
"deliberately elicited" test shifts the balance to the private interest to shield the
individual from governmental action. Grano, supra note 7, at 19-25. By distinguish-
ing the two standards in Innis, the Court implicitly demonstrates its intent to protect
individuals by creating a wide and seemingly impenetrable zone around Masslah
rights. Compare Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) with United States v.
Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980).
60. Unless the critical stage factor is incorporated into the analysis, the
Massiah-Miranda distinctions would be in disarray. Massiah's "deliberately elicited"
test is clearly more subtle, but more comprehensively applied, than the Miranda
"interrogation" test. Assuming the absence of the critical stage factor, if the Massiah
type questioning were subject to a fifth amendment-Miranda analysis, it is clear that
the questioning would not constitute an interrogation. Innis defined interrogation as
"either express questioning or its functional equivalent. . . . [This includes] any
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682,
1689 (1980) (footnotes omitted). The Court noted that "interrogation" under the fifth
and sixth amendments is not an interchangeable term. Id. at 1689 n.4. Although the
ploys used in both Rhode Island v. Innis and Brewer v. Williams are almost indistin-
guishable, the Massiah test extended far beyond a Miranda test to exclude the
statements in Henry and Brewer. It seems, therefore, that an interface exists bet-
ween a fifth amendment-Miranda analysis and a sixth amendment-Massiah analysis.
United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2188 (1980). In Hlenrj it was argued that "a
less rigorous standard [should apply] under the Sixth Amendment where the accused
is prompted by an undisclosed undercover informant than where the accused is
speaking in the hearing of persons he knows to be government oficers." Id. This
argument was rejected, however, because it attempted "to infuse Fifth Amendment
concerns against compelled self-incrimination into the Sixth Amendment protection of
the right to the assistance of counsel." Id. Once a Maysiah analysis attaches, it is
[Vol. 49
SIXTH AMENDMENT WAIVERS
able, 61 a critical stage of prosecution that will trigger the right to
counsel in a sixth amendment setting provides the analytical line of
demarcation between the two constitutional standards.62
The Massiah analysis commands a powerful position in any sixth
amendment questioning setting. Consideration of the open waiver
question may be the best demonstration of its significance. Although
the Miranda waiver issue is resolved, the Massiah waiver issue was
left unresolved in Brewer.63 Consequently, questions exist concern-
ing the propriety of the accused waiving rights that have attached,
the characteristics of the waiver, and the necessity of an attorney's
presence and consent to the waiver. While the answers to these ques-
tions are unclear, some guidance does exist in precedent.
III. THE MASSIAH WAIVER
A. Is a Sixth Amendment Wairer Permissible?
Historically, constitutional guarantees have been deemed to be per-
sonal to the individual. 64 A fortiori, the individual can choose not to
clear that a broader range of tactics will render statements inadmissible than if similar
tactics were employed under a Miranda analysis. The Massiah rule seems, therefore,
to have limitless application to even the most subtle situations. This characteristic of
the Massiah rule alleviates the tension between Innis and Brewer. Rhode Island v.
Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1691 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring). The "subtle compul-
sion" that the Innis Court found not to be equal to a Miranda "interrogation" might
arguably be a Massiah "deliberate elicitation.' Under a M assiah analysis, he need not
be "in custody" for the protection to attach. The result in United States v. Henry *'is
not to read a 'custody' requirement, which is a prerequisite to the attachment of
Miranda rights, into this branch of the Sixth Amendment.... Rather. . . . the fact
of custody bears on whether the government 'deliberately elicited' the incriminating
statements .... " 100 S. Ct. at 2188 n.11.
61. See notes 59-60 supra. Compare Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966)
with Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
62. The dividing point between a sixth and fifth amendment analysis may be
subject to further fluctuation if the Court considers other stages of prosecution to be
critical. For example, grand jury proceedings are an apparent critical stage. the sixth
amendment rights, however, have not vet attached. The inquisitional, rather than
adversarial, nature of grand jury proceedings may explain this apparent inconsistency.
For a fifth amendment analysis in the grand jury setting, see United States v.
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 190 (1977). United States v. Mandujiano, 425 U.S. 564
(1976) (plurality opinion).
63. "The Court of Appeals did not hold, nor do we, that under the circumstances
of this case Williams could not, w ithout notice to counsel, have waived his rights
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. It only held, as do we, that he did
not." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 405-06 (1977) (footnote omitted).
64. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 419 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); cf.
United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2444 (1980) (fourth amendment rights are
violated only if the official conduct invades one's own legitimate expectation of pri-




exercise these rights. This option has been recognized under the
fourth, 65 fifth, 6 6 and sixth 67 amendments.
When constitutional guarantees under the sixth amendment are in-
volved, a strict standard for waiver is applied. To preserve the integ-
rity and fairness of the trial, the courts require that waiver of sixth
amendment rights be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntar-
ily. 68 This standard has been applied in waiver situations concerning
the right to confront witnesses, 69 the right to a jury trial, 70 the right
to counsel at trial, 71 the right to counsel during the entry of a guilty
plea, 72 the right to a speedy trial, 73 and the right to enter a plea of
guilty and withdraw a not guilty plea. 74 In view of the significant
body of case law that allows waiver of important sixth amendment
rights, it seems clear that a defendant may waive his right to the
assistance of counsel during questioning that follows a critical stage of
the prosecution. If waiver is permitted at stages of the prosecution as
critical as the circumstances presented in Massiah, Brewer, and
Henry, it would be anomalous to reject the potential for waiver in the
post-critical stage questioning setting as well. 75
65. Under a fourth amendment analysis, the decision not to invoke an individual's
right is viewed as "consent" rather than "waiver." See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973),
66. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-79 (1966).
67. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975).
68. The sixth amendment waiver standard is "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938). A heavy burden is on the government to demonstrate that the right to coun-
sel has been waived because of the great responsibility on the trial judge to evaluate
the validity of the waiver. Id. at 464-65; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835
(1975); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)
69. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1966); see United States v. Price, 577
F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1068 (1979); United States v.
Calhoun, 544 F.2d 291, 296-97 (6th Cir. 1976).
70. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277-78 (1942); see
United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939, 942 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843
(1979).
71. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); see United States v. Aponte,
591 F.2d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 1978); Badger v. Cardwell, 587 F.2d 968, 972 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 105 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 969 (1978).
72. Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1, 3 (1972) (per curiam); Van Moltke v. Gillies, 332
U.S. 708, 720-21 (1948). see Lewellyn v. Wainwright, 593 F.2d 15, 16 (5th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam).
73. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972); see United States v. Poulack, 556
F.2d 83, 84 & n.1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977); United States v.
Didier, 542 F.2d 1182, 1184 (2d Cir. 1976).
74. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
75. See Grano, supra note 7, at 34-36.
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B. What Type of Waiver Is Required?
Assuming that waiver is permissible, the next issue that arises is
whether the waiver must be explicitly made or whether the waiver
may be implied from the circumstances. Although either an explicit
or implicit %vaiver is permissible under a fifth amendment analysis, a
sixth amendment analysis apparently precludes an implied waiver of
the right to counsel in post-critical stage settings. The courts have
recognized that the sixth amendment demands a higher standard of
waiver of the right to counsel than is required for waiver of fifth
amendment-Miranda rights7 6 because the purpose of the criminal in-
vestigation has shifted from investigator), to accusatory." Therefore,
the conceptual underpinning of the sixth amendment does not sup-
port an implied waiver analysis because cooperation at a critical stage
may increase the likelihood of conviction. An express waiver is per-
mitted 78 because the intent to cooperate is clearly and unambigu-
ously demonstrated.
Moreover, given the application of a higher standard of waiver
under a sixth amendment analysis, case law supports the proposition
that implicit waivers are unacceptable under that analysis. For exam-
ple, the factual patterns in Massiah v. United States,7 9 United States
v. Henry, 80 and Hoffa v. United States 81 are fundamentally indistin-
guishable. In each case, the government utilized an informant as a
76. United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1147 (2d Cir. 1980); Carvey v.
LeFevre, 611 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1858 (1980);, Un-
ited States v. Massimo, 432 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1971). The Supreme Court has yet to define the charac-
teristics of a Massiah waiver under the sixth amendment, although certain justices
have made their positions known. Justice White found no distinctions between Mas-
siah and Miranda rights. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 435-38 (1977) (White, J..
dissenting). He, therefore, would not perceive a higher standard for sixth amendment
waivers. Justice Blackmun, however, has implied that the sixth amendment demands
a higher waiver standard. When the Court permitted implied waivers of Miranda
rights, the majority supported their rationale through the use of the sixth amendment
waiver standard. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1979) (citing
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Justice Blackmun noted that applying
the Johnson standard in a fifth amendment context was inappropriate. 441 U.S. at
376-77 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Grano, supra note 7, at 35 n.215.
77. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
689-90 (1972); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
78. The dissenters in Brewer found a waiver of the suspect's right to counsel.
Chief Justice Burger noted that the waiver was valid because the incriminating
statements were made voluntarily and in full awareness of the Miranda rights.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 417-20 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice
White stated that a waiver was implied by the suspect's actions. Id. at 433-37 (White,
J., dissenting).
79. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
80. 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980).
81. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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means of obtaining incriminating statements. 8 2 Nevertheless, the re-
sults differed dramatically. In Massiah and Henry, the incriminating
statements, being "deliberately elicited," were excluded under a sixth
amendment analysis. 83 whereas Hoffa's statements were found to be
admissible .8 4 Although the decisions are difficult to justify factually,
the salutary distinguishing factor is that Massiah and Henry had en-
tered critical stages of prosecution, 8 while Hoffa had not. 86
Because the three cases differed on the main issue of application of
sixth amendment rights, it seems to follow that different results
would be reached on the ancillary issue of waiver. In light of Rhode
Island v. Innis 87 and North Carolina v. Butler,88 it seems clear that
Hoffa could have waived his right to counsel, even though unaware of
the informer's status, because the questioning would not constitute
deliberate elicitation or interrogation. 8 9 In stark contrast, the lack of
knowledge concerning the nature of the informant in Massiah and
Henry precluded waiver because an individual is incapable of waiving
that fundamental sixth amendment guarantee if knowledge of impor-
tant factors bearing on that right was lacking. 90 A higher standard of
waiver would seem mandatory in the sixth amendment setting be-
cause of the greater protection afforded under the Massiah analysis
than a Miranda analysis in identical circumstances.
82. See notes 37-40, 55-56 supra and accompanying text. In Hoffai, an undis-
closed government informer reported on the activities of suspect's counsel during
preparation of a Taft-Hartley trial. The incriminating statements, however, were used
for a subsequent bribery trial. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 296 (1966), See
also Kamisar, supra note 9, at 55-63.
83. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2187-89 (1980); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964). Hoffa also fits easily into a fifth amendment-
Miranda analysis because Hoffa was not "in custody" and was not the subject of
"interrogation." See Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1632, 1689-90 (1980). Massiah
was also not "in custody." Because he was under indictment, however, a sixth
amendment analysis using the "deliberately elicited" test was adopted. In a sixth
amendment situation, "[clustody . . . is not controlling." Id. at 1689 n,4.
84. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 309-10 (1G66).
85. Massiah and Henry were under indictment at the time they made incriminat-
ing statements. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2184 (1980); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201, 202-03 (1964).
86. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 309-10 (1966). The incriminating state-
ments were used at a subsequent trial even though they were made during a critical
stage of an unrelated prosecution. Id. at 309-10; see note 82 supra.
87. 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
88. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
89. See notes 59-60 supra.
90. In Henry, the Court stated that "the concept of a knowing and voluntary
waiver of Sixth Amendment rights does not apply in the context of communication
with an undisclosed undercover informant acting for the government." United States
v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2188 (1980); accord, United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d




Rhode Island c. Innis 91 and Brewer c. Williams 92 also involved
similar factual patterns with different legal results. In both Innis and
Brewer, the defendants were engaged in conversations with police
officers who were escorting them in a police car. 93 As a result of
those conversations, each defendant made incriminating statements. 94
Even though both defendants were informed of their Miranda
rights, 95 the Court reached different conclusions. In Innis, the con-
versation did not even amount to "interrogation." ' 96 As a result,
there was no violation of Innis' fifth amendment rights because they
had not attached; the incriminating statements were, therefore, ad-
missible. 97 The questioning in Brewer, on the other hand, was de-
signed to elicit incriminating testimony from the accused without the
presence of counsel. 98 Consequently, Williams' sixth amendment
right to counsel was violated and the statements were inadmissible.99
If the police conversation in Innis had been an interrogation, an
implicit waiver would seem apparent under the analysis in North
Carolina v. Butler. 100 In both cases, the defendants, after being ap-
prised of their Miranda rights,101 made statements that were admis-
sible despite the lack of a specific acknowledgment of each element of
those rights.102 The statements in Brewer were not admissible, how-
ever, because the defendant did not, and could not, explicitly waive a
guarantee when the elements of that guarantee were not specifically
explained. 103
91. 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
92. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
93. The Rhode Island policemen, having a conversation that the suspect could
obviously overhear, expressed concern that the hidden shotgun involved in the
crimes could be found by retarded children from a nearby school, who might hurt
themselves. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1686-87. The Iowa policeman in
Brewer specifically addressed the suspect, delivering the "Christian burial speech" to
persuade the defendant to reveal the location of the body of the murdered girl.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 391-93.
94. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1687; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at
393.
95. The suspect in Innis was given his Miranda rights three times-twice at
arrest and once before he brought the police to the hiding place of the gun. Rhode
Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1686-87. The accused in Brewr was also given his
Miranda rights three times-when booked, when arraigned, and when met by the
officer who eventually questioned him. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 390-91.
96. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1690-91.
97. See id.
98. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 405-06.
99. Id.
100. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
101. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1686-87 (1980); North Carolina v. Butler,
441 U.S. at 371 n.1.
102. "[T]he defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a
course of conduct indicating waiver, may . . . support a conclusion that a defenckhut
has waived his rights." North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
103. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 402 (1977).
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The distinction between these results demonstrates that a sixth
amendment waiver analysis requires an explicit acknowledgment of
each element of the guarantee and the specific circumstances in
which it attaches. 10 4 Because the inference of knowledge from the
simple recitation to the defendant of his Miranda rights does not
satisfy the higher standard, it logically follows that the waiver of those
rights will not be implied under the more stringent standard. 10 5 To
preserve a semblance of conceptual consistency between the fifth and
sixth amendment analyses, the higher standard of waiver under the
sixth amendment requires express statements of waiver for each
specific element under the guarantee, thus adding credence to the
purportedly greater protections afforded under a sixth amendment-
Massiah analysis. A lesser standard would distort the balance that the
courts have attempted to create in this area.
C. What Procedures Will Insure a Proper Waiver?
While a defendant may waive the guarantees of the fifth amend-
ment in the absence of his attorney, sixth amendment procedure is
muddled because the federal and state courts have developed three
alternative standards for waiver.
1. The Per Se Rule
Some federal and state courts have opted for a strict per se stan-
dard of waiver for the sixth amendment right to counsel in a post-
critical stage setting. 10 6 Under this standard, waiver is impermissible
in the absence of, and without the advice or consent of, the attorney,
even though Miranda warnings may have been given. 107 This posi-
104. Compare Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404-05 (1975) with North
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
105. See J. Nowak, R Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 504
(1978).
106. See United States v. Durham, 475 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); United States
ex rel. O'Connor v. New Jersey, 405 F.2d 632 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 923(1969); Hancock v. White, 378 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1967); United States v. Howard,
426 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); United States ex rel. Lopez v. Zelker, 344 F.
Supp. 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1049 (1972). Several states have adopted a strict per se rule of waiver. People v,
Isby, 267 Cal. App. 2d 484, 73 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1968); Williams v. State, 188 So. 2d
320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), modified on other grounds, 198 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1967);
State v. Peters, 545 S.W.2d 414 (Mo. 1976); State v. Witt, 422 S.W.2d 304 (Mo.
1967); State v. Johns, 185 Neb. 590, 177 N.W.2d 580 (1970); State v. Green, 46 N.J.
192, 215 A.2d 546 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 946 (1966); People v. Settles, 46
N.Y.2d 154, 385 N.E.2d 612, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978); People v. Hobson, 39
N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976); In re Robinson, 125 Vt. 343,
215 A.2d 525 (1965).
107. Support for the adoption of a per se rule exists in Supreme Court opinions.
See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
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tion, however, is beyond the periphery of the rights enunciated
under Massiah and its progeny. 10 8 In adopting this stance, these
courts have provided considerable protection to the defendant by sig-
nificantly restricting the prosecution's ability to question the defen-
dant.
2. The Super-Miranda Rule
The majority position among federal and state courts is that waiver
is permissible in the absence of counsel if appropriate procedural
safeguards exist to insure a knowing and intelligent waiver.109 Ini-
327 (Stewart, J., concurring). To date, however, a majority of the Court has not sup-
ported this position. Whether the right to counsel could be waived in the absence of
counsel has been left open and the procedures needed to effectuate that waiver have
not been delineated. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 405-06 (1975). The American
Law Institute, however, has adopted a modified per se approach by allowing waivers,
but not questioning, without the presence of counsel. ALl Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure § 140.8 (1975).
108. New York's position is the most developed and best represents the per se
rule. See Kelder, Criminal Procedure, 1978 Survey of N.Y. Law, 30 Syracuse L.
Rev. 15, 121-26 (1979); The Survey of New York Practice, 51 St. John's L. Rev. 201,
216-22 (1976). In New York, .'a criminal defendant under indictment and in custody
may not waive his right to counsel unless he does so in the presence of an attorney."
People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 162-63, 385 N.E.2d 612, 616, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874,
879 (1978) (citations omitted); see People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 481, 348 N.E.2d
894, 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (1976); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 151, 193
N.E.2d 628, 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842-43 (1963). Moreover, even if the Supreme
Court ultimately decides against a per se waiver rule, the New York rule would not
be affected because its basis is in the state constitution. People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d
at 161, 385 N.E.2d at 615, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
109. See United States v. Brown, 569 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Monti, 557 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Satterfield, 558 F.2d 655 (2d
Cir. 1976); Moore v. Wolff, 495 F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974 United States v. Cobbs, 481
F.2d 196 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973); United States v. Springer, 460
F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972). Coughlan v. United States,
391 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968); United States v. Miller,
432 F. Supp. 382 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), affd sub nom. United States v. Fernandez, 573
F.2d 1297 (2d Cir. 1978); Thompson v. State, 347 So. 2d 1371 (Ala. Crim. App.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018 (1978); State ex rel. Berger v. Superior Court, 105
Ariz. 553, 468 P.2d 580 (1970); State v. McLucas, 172 Conn. 542, 375 A.2d 1014,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977); Jackson v. United States, 404 A.2d 911 (D.C.
1979); Sanders v. State, 378 So. 2d 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Shouse v. State,
231 Ga. 716, 203 S.E.2d 537 (1974); People v. Sandoval, 41 11. App. 3d 741, 353
N.E.2d 715 (1976); Jackson v. State, 268 Ind. 360, 375 N.E.2d 223 (1978 State v.
Johnson, 223 Kan. 237, 573 P.2d 994 (1977); State v. Cotton, 341 So. 2d 355 (La.
1976); State v. Carter, 412 A.2d 56 (Me. 1980); State v. Blizzard, 278 Md. 556, 366
A.2d 1026 (1976); Commonwealth v. Andujar, 79 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1245, 390
N.E.2d 276 (1979); People v. Green, 405 Mich. 273, 274 N.W.2d 448 (1979) State v.
Hull, - Minn. -, 269 N.W.2d 905 (1978); State v. Havnes, 288 Or. 59, 60"2 P.2d
272 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2175 (1980) Commonwealth v. Yates, 467 Pa.
362, 357 A.2d 134 (1976); State v. Pendergrass, 270 S.C. 1, 239 S.E.2d 750 (1977);
Lamb v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 307, 227 S.E.2d 737 (1976).
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tially, the courts mandate that the requirements of Miranda v.
Arizona be met. 110 Thereafter, the courts will examine the facts and
circumstances of the particular case to determine whether additional
safeguards were provided to insure a knowing and intelligent
waiver."' If protections in addition to those set forth in Miranda are
provided to guarantee that the higher standard for the sixth amend-
ment waiver is met, the courts that follow this position generally will
recognize the permissibility of waiver. This stance, therefore, is aptly
termed the "super-Miranda rule" because it requires a showing that
safeguards beyond Miranda were provided. 1 12 In these jurisdictions,
a per se rule is deemed inappropriate because of the sufficiency of'
the additional safeguards to protect the defendant. Furthermore, the
per se rule has been specifically rejected under this line of reasoning
for the courts can find no support under Massiah for requiring the
presence of counsel for waiver. 113
3. The New Second Circuit Rule
Prior to its decision in United States v. Mohabir,114 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals had adopted a "super-Miranda" rule of
110. See United States v. Satterfield, 558 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 4(9 U.S. 873 (1972).
111. See, e.g., Carvey v. LeFevre, 611 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 1858 (1980); United States v. Satterfield, 558 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1976).
112. No uniform set of standards to implement this rule exists, however, and the
sufficiency of additional requirements varies among the courts. Compare United
States v. Satterfield, 558 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1976) with Coughlan v. United States,
391 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968). Some dissatisfaction with
the approach was, therefore, inevitable. As the court noted in Coughlan, lilt may
well be that the day is approaching when the right to counsel may be expanded to
the point where an accused may only be interrogated by the police in the presence of
his lawyer." 391 F.2d at 372.
113. Representative of this position are the Second Circuit decisions under United
States v. Satterfield, 558 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1976). See Carvey v. LeFevre, 611 F.2d
19 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1858 (1980); United States v. Lord, 565
F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1977). After considering the requirements of Massiah and after
reviewing other waiver principles, the circuit holds that, if a defendant is properly
advised of his rights and the options available to him, he may knowingly, voluntarily,
and explicitly waive his right to counsel. The circuit relies upon precedent that
acknowledges the permissibility of waiver in other circumstances. The circuit, how-
ever, has acknowledged that explicit statements of waiver are required. See United
States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1980); pt. IV(B) supra. Therefore, in
addition to the recital of Miranda rights, the Second Circuit requires that the nature
of the proceedings and the available alternatives be explained to the defendant in
terms that he understands. If the defendant acknowledges that he understands his
rights and asserts his desire to waive them, the waiver is permissible. Although the
Second Circuit recognizes that the standard for waiver under the sixth amendment is
more stringent than under the fifth amendment, statements received in the absence
of counsel and during critical stages of prosecution will be deemed proper. United
States v. Satterfield, 558 F.2d at 657.
114. 624 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1980).
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wvaiver. 115 Mohabir represents a distinct shift in that position and
provides a unique procedure for sixth amendment waiver. Following
his indictment but prior to his arraignment, Mohabir was brought to
an office of an Assistant United States Attorney for questioning pur-
suant to a routine practice. 116 After being advised of his Miranda
rights, Mohabir made incriminating statements that were instrumen-
tal in obtaining his conviction. 117 On appeal, the use of Miranda
warnings to satisfy the sixth amendment waiver standard was at-
tacked. 118
Tracing the circuit's decisions after Judge Friendly's influential dis-
sent in United States v. Massimo, 119 the Mohabir court noted its con-
sistent reliance on a higher standard of waiver under the sixth
amendment. 120 Those cases uniformly held that Miranda warnings
were insufficient to satisfy the sixth amendment waiver standards and
that the sixth amendment required additional inquiry into waiver.
Despite the recital of Miranda warnings, no sixth amendment waiver
could result if the defendant was emotionally unprepared to waive 121
or if the defendant was not informed of the nature of the indict-
ment.12 2 Prior precedent, therefore, indicated that a sixth amend-
ment vaiver was impermissible in the absence of a "super-Miranda"
type procedure. ' 23
Mohabir altered that thinking. The circuit court, after analy'zing
the existing rationales, 124 held that waiver of the sixth amendment
115. See note 113 supra.
116. United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1145 (2d Cir. 1980). That practice
previously had been criticized in the Second Circuit. See United States v. Duvall,
537 F.2d 15, 22-26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
117. United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d at 1146.
118. Id.
119. 432 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1022 (1971).
120. United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d at 1146-50.
121. United States v. Satterfield, 558 F.2d 655, 657 (2d Cir. 1976).
122. Carvey v. LeFevre, 611 F.2d 19, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1979). cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 1858 (1980).
123. Id. at 22.
124. The circuit court initially examined the adoption of a per se rule to exclude
all statements in the absence of counsel. United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140,
1152 (2d Cir. 1980). Consideration of this restrictive approach was deferred. "Such a
course would be the most drastic .... [It] might run counter to the policy that a
defendant constitutionally can insist upon proceeding without counsel even though he
has been fully advised of the folly of doing so." Id. at 1153 (footnote omitted). The
court further analyzed a "'super-,iranda" procedure that would insure a knowing and
intelligent waiver, id. at 1151-52, but it rejected this rationale because of the serious
ethical conflicts that exist when a prosecutor or law enforcement official advises a
defendant in an adversarial context. Id. at 1152-53. Many courts have expressed their
concern over the ethical conflicts inherent in this situation. See United States v.
Brown, 569 F.2d 236, 249-51 (5th Cir. 1978) (Simpson, J., dissenting) United States
v. Crook, 502 F.2d 1378, 1380 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975Y
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right to counsel will be invalid unless an impartial .judicial officer ad-
ministers "super-Miranda" type warnings and advice 125 to assure full
comprehension of that right. 126 By adopting that procedure, the Sec-
ond Circuit panel instituted a unique and innovative test for weighing
sixth amendment waivers. 127
IV. A RECOMMENDED APPROACH
To date, little guidance has flowed from the Supreme Court con-
cerning sixth amendment waivers. Thus, a definitive method for in-
suring a proper balance between the defendant's constitutional
guarantee and the need for effective law enforcement does not exist.
The judicial officer rule of the Second Circuit should be uniformly
adopted not only because it incorporates the benefits of the per se
rule and the "super-Miranda" rule without their respective draw-
backs, but also because it will effectively satisfy the higher waiver
standard of the sixth amendment.
The per se rule shrouds a defendant in maximum sixth amendment
protections. Yet, by failing to recognize a defendant's ability to exer-
cise his choice in the absence of counsel, the rule overly restricts a
defendant's freedom, doing a disservice to his right to the advice and
consent of counsel.' 28 Furthermore, assuming the absence of a per
United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1352-53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
873 (1972). The Second Circuit had raised the issue in its decision in Massilah, but
the Supreme Court did not provide further enlightenment on the topic. United
States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
125. "'To avoid the ethical problems inherent in imposing on the prosecutor this
obligation to inform and to secure the benefits of the neutral intervention of a judicial
officer at this critical stage, we conclude, in the exercise of our supervisory power,
that a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to have counsel present during
post-indictment interrogation must be preceded by a federal judicial officer's explana-
tion of the content and significance of this right. Normally, this would occur at the
appearance before the court or magistrate required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 9(c)(1). In
addition to the advice of rights given at an appearance required by Fed. R. Crim. P.
5(a), following an arrest upon a complaint, a defendant arrested after indictment
should be shown the indictment and told by the judicial officer that he has been
indicted, the significance of the indictment, that he has a right to counsel, and the
seriousness of his situation in the event he should decide to answer questions of any
law enforcement officers in the absence of counsel." United States v. Mohabir, 624
F.2d at 1153.
126. Id. at 1153.
127. No other court has adopted the Second Circuit approach to sixth amendment
waivers.
128. "The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel,
like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a
willing defendant-not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defen-
dant and his right to defend himself personally. To thrust counsel upon the accused,
against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment. In such a
case, counsel is not an assistant, but a master; and the right to make a defense is
stripped of the personal character upon which the Amendment insists .... An un-
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se standard in the wide range of permissible sixth amendment waiv-
ers,129 it would seem anomalous to impose a narrower restriction for
similar guarantees under Massiah. 130 Precedent indicates that a de-
fendant may embark on a course of folly if it is his knowing and intel-
ligent choice to do so.131 The rejection of a per se rule of waiver
under a fifth amendment analysis 132 and the emphasis placed on the
extent of the defendant's knovledge, irrespective of the presence of
counsel, under sixth amendment analysis 133 leads to the conclusion
that a per se rule of waiver would extend unjustifiably beyond the
requirements of Massiah. 134
Finally, a per se rule does not foreclose collateral attacks on a pur-
ported waiver. 1- Because a per se rule would operate without the
necessity for, or benefit of, a uniform set of standards for waiver, the
defendants will rely on the advice of different attorneys, which may
vary the requirement to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of
sixth amendment rights. 1'3 6 In this situation, a defendant's waiver
may still be invalid despite the presence of an attorney because faulty
or insufficient information will not satisfy the higher standard of sixth
amendment waiver. 137 Therefore, a per se rule may serve merely to
complicate the waiver mechanism without uaranteeing the effective-
ness of the waiver or providing actual benefits to either the defendant
or the justice system.
wanted counsel 'represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable
legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense
presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a ver. real
sense, it is not his defense." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820-21 (1975) (cita-
tions and footnote omitted).
129. See notes 66-72 supra and accompanying text.
130. Massiah relied upon Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), although it
apparently did not adopt the per se approach recommended by the concurring jus-
tices. See note 107 supra.
131. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
132. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1979).
133. For example, in both Massiah and Henry, the defendant's ignorance of the
informant's role precluded a finding of a knowing waiver. United States v. Henry,
100 S. Ct. 2183, 2188-89 (1980), Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964,
see Carvey v. LeFevre, 611 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1979) (failure to inform defendant of
nature of indictment), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1858 (1980).
134. The state courts are free to interpret their constitutions more broadly than
the sixth amendment and adopt a per se rule. See People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154,
165, 385 N.E.2d 612, 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (1978). The Supreme Court would
therefore be precluded from further review. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S.
369, 376 n.7 (1979); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940).
135. Collateral attacks on improperly entered judgments are allowed in the federal
court system. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
136. The per se rule merely excludes statements made in the absence of counsel.
The flaw in the rule is that it provides defense counsel wvith minimal specific gui-
dance concerning the exact scope of his duties in a waiver situation.
137. See United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980. Carvev v. LAFevre, 611
F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 100 S. Ct. 1858 (1980).
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The "super-Miranda" standards represent a more balanced alterna-
tive than the per se rule. This approach accommodates both the de-
fendant's right to waive counsel and the government's duty to solve
crimes. Because the "super-Miranda" warnings would be issued by
the prosecutor or his agents, however, serious ethical problems would
arise in the inherently adversarial context of the questioning ses-
sion. 138 Unnecessary pressure is placed on the prosecutor to play the
dual role of fair and impartial advisor to the defendant and staunch
advocate for the government. In addition, by allowing the prosecutor
to gain access to pertinent information, even through a "super-
Miranda" procedure, the defendant's leverage to seek a grant of im-
munity or lesser plea is diminished. Cooperation prior to an agree-
ment with the government concerning those amenities will necessar-
ily restrict the defendant's bargaining position.
The defendant's ability to contest the validity of a waiver taken in
the adversarial context of prosecutorial interrogation further di-
minishes the desirability of the "super-Miranda" rule. 139 Due to the
court's careful review of these arguments, additional efforts will be
needed to hear the claims of invalid waivers. That time and eflort
could be better utilized by providing a procedure that would assure
knowing and intelligent waivers and minimize the frequency of' claims
of invalidity.
The Second Circuit approach represents the most practical alterna-
tive. That procedure guarantees that proper safeguards will be used
to assure a valid waiver and relieves the prosecutor of the severe
ethical conflicts inherent in the "super-Miranda" context. The proce-
dures provided for the acceptance of guilty pleas,140 the choice of a
non-jury trial, 14' and the option to proceed at trial without counsel 42
strongly support the Second Circuit's posture. Those procedures not
only recognize a defendant's right to waive these guarantees, but also
set forth specifically drawn standards, administered by the trial judge,
that adequately apprise the defendant of his position. 143 The
safeguards proposed by the Second Circuit, therefore, would require
138. See note 124 supra.
139. A mechanism for de novo judicial review of these claims has been provided.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976,,.
140. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969). Rules 11(c) and 11(d) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth the procedure concerning guilty
pleas. For example, the court must inform the defendant of the nature of the charge,
the possible sentences, the right to counsel, and the ramifications of his pleadings.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c). The court must also insure that the plea is voluntarily en-
tered. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d). But see United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780
(1979) (failure to advise defendant about every step under Rule 11 is not basis for
overturning plea).
141. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 3.17 U.S. 269, 275 (1942).
142. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975).
143. See notes 129-30 supra and accompanying text.
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no greater effort to administer than those administered in other simi-
lar critical situations.
Moreover, the procedure would not impose undue hardship or in-
convenience on any party. In light of the uniform procedure for pre-
senting a person before a judicial officer, 14 the awarding of additional
safeguards would not pose any extraordinary burden on the system.
In fact, any judicial officer-whether from the state or federal
system-could initiate the waiver procedure. 145
The Second Circuit judicial officer rule would unify federal waiver
practice under Massiah, thereby insuring that the higher standard for
waiver under the sixth amendment is met. By assuring both the exis-
tence of these safeguards and their uniform application by impartial
advisors, the additional effort and time needed to process claims of
invalid waiver will be reduced substantially, if not entirely. The clear
benefits of the judicial-officer rule demonstrate that this procedure is
the best method for insuring proper waivers.
CONCLUSION
The courts have developed different tests and requirements to deal
with the rights safeguarded by the fifth and sixth amendments. Speci-
fically, the government must clearly meet a higher standard when
sixth amendment rights are implicated than when fifth amendment
rights are involved. The courts act like doting parents when the initi-
ation of judicial criminal proceedings triggers the application of the
sixth amendment. Different standards for waiver should be appro-
priately developed for each amendment because the very integrity of
the trial process is challenged in the context of a sixth amendment
analysis. Beyond that realization, however, the sixth amendment re-
mains an enigma. Clarification must be forthcoming from the United
States Supreme Court.
It is submitted that a demarcation between constitutional and un-
constitutional waivers of rights should be clear and exact. An accep-
tance of uncertainty and ambiguity by the courts would forcibly di-
minish the role that the law should play in locating the proper bal-
ance between the competing demands for effective law enforcement
and the protection of fundamental constitutional rights.
144. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a).
145. Id.
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